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COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRENCH AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
Ana Peyro Llopis·
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the American perspective on the enforcement of international law compatible
with the French perspective? For American legal scholars, the term enforcement is
sometimes used as the equivalent of the following French notions: mise en oeuvre,
application, and also coercition. The American term enforcement appears to be used
in situations where the French prefer legal terms that are closer to the connotation of
implementation rather than that of enforcement. What are the consequences of the use
of such different terms? Is there, behind the use of different language, with different
meanings and approaches, a different perspective on the enforcement of international
law as between France and the United States?
The question of the enforcement of international law can be examined from at
least two perspectives. On the one hand, it is possible to analyze the way international
law is enforced in domestic legal orders and municipal law. But international law can
also be enforced using international mechanisms. This Article will analyze enforcement in the field of collective security, as it is the most controversial field of enforcement action. The relevant mechanisms in this field are mainly economic sanctions and
armed interventions.
One should note that in the field of economic sanctions, the French position is
better viewed as part of the European position. Indeed, the power to adopt sanctions
against third-party States has been delegated by member States to the European
Community. In this sense, it is not possible to identify a uniquely French position.
Military sanctions are the other tool used to enforce international law that are
analyzed in this Article. International practice has recently made military measures
somewhat commonplace, presenting them as merely another way of enforcing
international law. Currently, it is still possible to speak about a real French perspective
-and not a European one--as military intervention remains mainly within the power
of States, and is a responsibility that has only been partially delegated to the European
Union. Moreover, European practice in this field is strongly influenced by the French
experience.
Furthermore, the interest of analyzing these two mechanisms of enforcement is
that they illustrate an erroneous but common position, namely that the United States
has a broader notion of the enforcement of international law than other States, and
notably, one that is broader than its continental European allies. American and French
perspectives on the enforcement of international law are in fact not as distant as one
would imagine.

•

Maitre de conferences en droit public, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise (Paris).
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This Article will examine and compare enforcement actions led by the United
States and by France, and the underlying justifications for each country's respective
actions. Such an examination raises many questions: What arguments are used to
justify enforcement action in the field of collective security? Which arguments are
invoked by the United States? Are the arguments France invokes as different as we
currently assume? Does the United States truly have a broader conception of the
legality of enforcement actions, one closer to the notion of legitimacy, while France
defends a narrow conception of international legality? The answers to these questions
are different than one might expect, and require further discussion. But first of all,
clarification of the relevant words used by each country in this area oflaw is merited.
Are the two countries speaking the same language when the United States talks about
'enforcement,' and France talks of coercition?
II. ENFORCEMENT AND COERC/TION: COMMENTS, DIGRESSIONS ON WORDS,
AND DIVERSION OF MEANING

A. The English Language: the Notion of Enforcement
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term enforcement as "[t]he action or
process of enforcing." 1 Then it specifies, inter a/ia, "[t]he action or process of
increasing the strength of anything (esp. an armed force, etc.); [] a reinforcement,"
"[ e]nergetic activity; an effort," "[t]he urging [of] a demand, pressing home an
argument, representation, or statement," "[t]he action of bringing force to bear upon,
doing violence to, or overcoming by force (a person or thing)," and "[c]onstraint,
compulsion; a constraining or compelling influence." 2
The World Book Dictionary contains the following definition of enforcement:
"[T]he act or process of enforcing; putting into force. " 3 In addition, the term to enforce
means: "1. to force obedience to; cause to be carried out; put into force; 2. to force;
compel; 3. to urge with force; emphasize.'"' Finally, the World Book Encyclopedia
refers to law enforcement as "the means by which a community, state, or country keeps
order." 5
Therefore, it appears that the term enforcement is defined broadly and that it
implies in any case a certain degree of force.

B. The French Language: The Notion of Coercition
The French Dictionary Petit Robert defines the term coercition as the act or
process of constraining, enforcing, and/or compelling("[ a]ction de contraindre"). 6 To
enforce, or contraindre, means to force someone to act against her will("[ t]orcer (qqn)
aagir contre sa volonte"), and futhermore, to oblige her by law ("[ o]bliger par voie de

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

5 OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY
245 (2d ed. 1989).
Id.
1 THE WORLDBOOK DICTIONARY
700 (1991).
Id.
12 THE WORLDBOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA
141 (2005).
LE PETITROBERTDICTIONNAIRE
447 (2000).
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droit"). 7 Professors Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier define the term contrainte in their
treatise on international law as·"any kind of pressure other than the use of force, so
serious as to change the decision ofa physical being [representative of the State] or a
moral being [the State itself] to whom the pressure is applied." 8
The Dictionnaire de droit international public-in French, although edited by the
Belgian Professor Jean Salmon-proposes the following doctrinal definitions of
coercition: first, the "act of constraining," 9 and second, "constraint in any form" 10
referring to the General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) adopted on October 24,
1970. Such a definition, however, remains too general and is not sufficient to clearly
define the French notion of enforcement, of coercition.
Although coercition and contrainte are synonymous in this Dictionary, the
definition of the latter brings us further information. From a general perspective,
contrainte is the "act or threat of coercion against a subject of international law or its
representative." 11 Contrainte can also be a "coercive measure prohibited by a primary
rule ofinternational law [or] violence of an illegal nature. " 12 But constraint can be legal
in the following circumstances:
[I]f[the action] is a political, economic or military act of constraint, authorized by a
secondary rule of international law as a reaction to an internationally wrongful act,
or if provided for by the constitutional treaty of an international organization
empowering it to react to a treaty violation. These acts of constraint---decentralized
or institutional-tend primarily to exert pressure on the errant State to make it cease
its wrongful conduct. 13

Therefore, coercition is neither legal, nor wrongful per se. Such a qualification
depends on the existence of a previous wrongful act.
Gerard Cornu defines coercition as the "[c]onstraint from the State, against an
individual (imprisonment) or his property (seizure), consisting of the use of force in
the service of the Law (for the execution of an obligation) by Lawful means, except

7. Id. at 515.
PUBLIC929 (2002). My translation
8. PATRICKDAILLIER& ALAINPELLET,DROITINTERNATIONAL
of"[T]oute forme depression autre que le recours ala force, d'une gravite suffisante pour pouvoir inflechir
la decision de la personne physique (representant de l'Etat) ou de la personne morale (l'Etat lui-meme)
auxquelles cette pression est appliquee."
9. DICTIONNAIRE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC191 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001) [hereinafter
DICTIONNAIRE
SALMON].My translation of: "[A]ction de contraindre."
I0. Id. My translation of: "Contrainte quelle que soit sa forme."
11. Id. at 253. My translation of: "[A]cte ou menace de coercition exerces a l'encontre d'un sujet de
droit international ou de son representant."
12. Id. My translation of: "Mesure coercitive interdite par une regle 'primaire' du droit international.
Violence ayant un caractere illicite."
13. Id. My translation of:
"[L]a contrainte peut etre licite lorsqu'elle est une mesure coercitive d'ordre politique,
economique ou militaire, autorisee par une regle 'secondaire' du droit international general,
en guise de reaction a un fait intemationalement illicite, ou prevue par le traite constitutif
d'une organisation intemationale pour sanctionner la violation du traite. Les mesures de
contrainte en question-<1u 'elles soient decentralisees ou institutionnelles-- tendent avant
tout a faire pression sur l'Etat defaillant pour qu'il cesse son comportement illicite."
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 546 2006
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assault." 14 The act of constraining is thus the use of a legal force, which has as its
general objective the performance oflegal obligations by one subject thereto.
C. Lost in Translation

The terms of enforcement and coercition are translated in an interesting way for
the purposes of this paper. Translating from English into French, we can identify the
following:
coercion = coercition, contrainte
enforcement = mise en application, imposition
to enforce = mettre en application, appliquer, faire obeir ou faire respecter,
imposer, appuyer
forcible = de/par force

Note that the noun enforcement, or its verb, to enforce, are translated in a broad way.
On the other hand, we find that the equivalent of coercition is coercion and not
enforcement. The same situation appears in the opposite direction. From French into
English, we find that:
coercition = coercion
contrainte = constraint
mise en oeuvre = implementation
execution = enforcement

Thus, from a semantic perspective, it seems that the English term enforcement is
broader than the French terms used in the field of collective security, that is, coercition
or contrainte. The way international law makes use of both terms confirms that they
have a different meaning.

D. The International Definition
Some fundamental international legal documents include the translation of the
English term enforcement into French. The different meanings identified above are
recognized, but in the field of collective security, it appears that the terms enforcement
and coercition are often used as synonyms.
First, although the English version of the United Nations Charter uses the term
enforcement, the French version uses the term coercition. For example, the English
version of Article 2(5) reads as follows: "All Members ... shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." 15 The French version of this same section of the Charter,
however, refers to action preventive ou coercitive. 16 Furthermore, the English version
of Article 2(7) reads as follows: "[T]his principle shall not prejudice the application

JURIDIQUE160 (3d ed. 2002). My translation of: "Contrainte,
14. GERARDCORNU,VOCABULAIRE
d' origine etatique, exercee sur Jes biens d 'un individu (saisie) ou sa personne (emprisonnement) comportant
l'emploi de la force au service du Droit (pour !'execution d'une obligation) par des moyens conformes a
la loi (par les voies de droit) a !'exclusion des voies de fait."
15. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5.
16. Id. (French text).
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of enforcement measures under Chapter VIl." 17 The French version of this passage
reads: "[C]e principe ne porte en rien atteinte al'application des mesures de coercition
prevues au Chapitre VII." 18 The English version ofthe Charter thus uses a broader term
than the French version. Several Articles of the United Nations Charter refer to
enforcement measures or enforcement actions; however, these references do not give
any further information on the scope of these terms. As Georg Ress and Jurgen
Brehmer have pointed out, the expression enforcement action
should not be interpreted in an overly narrow fashion. The Language and systematic
structure of the Charter does not warrant such a restrictive view and form a
teleological point of view. The term should, as Walter has shown, be read as any
action which would otherwise be in violation of the prohibition of the use of force as
spelled out in Art. 2(4). 19

Thus, the original meaning of the term "enforcement" is, in the field of collective
security, close to the notion of "force". Therefore, enforcement will be legal or illegal,
depending on its conformity with the United Nations Charter requirements. In the
same vein, the General Assembly, in Resolution 2625, stated that"[ e]very State has the
duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the
elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to selfdetermination and freedom and independence." 20 The French text reads: "Tout Etat a
le devoir des' abstenir de recourir atoute mesure de coercition qui priverait les peuples

17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
18. Id. (French text). Article 5 of the United Nations Charter uses the term enforcement as well: "A
Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the
Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." U.N. Charter art. 5. In French this
provision becomes: "Un Membre de !'Organisation contre lequel une action preventive ou coercitive a ete
entreprise par le Conseil de securite peut etre suspendu par I' Assemblee generale, sur recommandation du
Conseil de securite, de l'exercice des droits et privileges inherents a la qualite de Membre." Id. (French
text). Article 45 also uses the term enforcement: "In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent
military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined
international enforcement action." U.N. Charter art. 45. In French this Article provides: "Afin de
permettre a )'Organisation de prendre d'urgence des mesures d'ordre militaire, des Membres des Nations
Unies maintiendront des contingents nationaux de forces aeriennes immediatement utilisables en vue de
l'execution combinee d'une action coercitive intemationale." Id. (French text). Article 50 includes the
term enforcement as well: "If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security
Council, any other state ... shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution
of those problems." U .N. Charter art. 50. In French this Article provides: "Si un Etat est l'obj et de mesures
preventives ou coercitives prises par le Conseil de securite, tout autre Etat ... a le droit de consulter le
Conseil de securite au sujet de la solution de ces difficultes." Id. (French text). Likewise, Article 53
contains the term enforcement: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council
.... " U.N. Charter art. 53, para. I. In French this provision reads: "Le Conseil de securite utilise, s'il y
a lieu, Jes accords ou organismes regionaux pour )'application des mesures coercitives prises sous son
autorite. Toutefois, aucune action coercitive ne sera entreprise en vertu d'accords regionaux ou par des
organismes regionaux sans l'autorisation du Conseil de securite .... " Id (French text).
19. I THECHARTER
OFTHEUNITEDNATIONS.A COMMENT
ARY 861 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2nd ed.
2002) (emphasis added).
20. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) (emphasis added).
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mentionnes ci-dessus, dans la formulation du present principe de leur droit adisposer
d'eux-memes, de leur liberte et de leur independance." 21
Second, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in
1969, provides that "[a] treaty is void ifits conclusion has been procured by the threat
or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations." 22 The title of Article 52 is: "Coercion of a State by the
threat or use of force" while the title of French Article 52 is: "Contrainte exercee sur
un Etat par la menace ou l'emploi de la force." 23 One should note that a non-binding
declaration was adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
entitled the Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic
Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties.24 The first paragraph of the declaration
"solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military,
political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any
act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign
equality of States and freedom of consent." 25 Coercion is therefore considered as a
"pressure" to perform a specific act.
Therefore, it is possible to identify the meaning of "enforcement" in the
framework of the United Nations. On the one hand, the French version of the United
Nations Charter, uses the expression mesures coercitives as equivalent to the English
term of "enforcement measures." On the other hand, if we read the Charter together
with the General Assembly Resolution and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, it seems that narrower terms are sometimes preferred, such as "forcible" in
the former and "coercion" in the latter. "Coercion" is seldom used in English and, in
the Vienna Convention, its use is limited not just to the use of force, but to the use of
armed force. Thus, enforcement has a broader meaning than the use of armed force and
than the use of force tout court, in the sense of Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. There is enforcement whenever there is a certain degree of force, and coercion
measures will be the ultimate degree of enforcement measures.
Beyond the field of collective security, the term enforcement is usually translated
as execution. For example, the notion of enforcement has been incorporated in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, part 10 of which is entitled
"Enforcement" and contains the following articles:
l 03, Role of States in enforcement of sentences of imprisonment; l 04, Change in
designation of State of enforcement; 105, Enforcement of the sentence; 106,
Supervision of enforcement of sentences and conditions of imprisonment; I 07,
Transfer of the person upon completion of sentence; l 08, Limitation on the
prosecution or punishment of other offences; I 09, Enforcement of fines and forfeiture
measures; 110, Review by the Court concerning reduction of sentence; and 111,
Escape.26

21. Id. (French text)(emphasis added).
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 52, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331.
23. Id. (English and French texts).
24. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/26 (May 23, 1969).
25. Id. 'I[ 1 (emphasis added).
26. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
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In French, this part of the Statute is not called Coercition but Execution, and wherever
enforcement is used in the English version, the French word execution is used.
The terminology used in these provisions differs from the provision of the United
Nations Charter dealing with the enforcement judgments of the International Court of
Justice. Article 94(2) of the Charter provides:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 27

In French, however, Article 94(2) refers to the "mesures aprendre pour faire executer
l'arret." 28 Thus, the French version uses the term execution for judgments, while in
English the term enforcement has been increasingly employed. Thus, it appears that
enforcement is translated by coercition in the field of collective security and by
execution where judgments are concerned.
However, there are some "enforcement measures" that are neither coercion
measures stricto sensu, nor the result of a judgment. To implement these measures, a
certain degree of force is necessary-a force that could violate territorial sovereignty.
Although the use of force is possible in such situations, the term execution in French
is preferred. For example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) case, the
court opined:
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations Amendment of May 1994 specifies in
further detail that force may be used by a protection officer under Section 8.1 of the
Act only when he is satisfied that boarding cannot be achieved by "less violent means
reasonable in the circumstances" and if one or more warning shots have been fired at
a safe distance (Sections 19.4 and 19.5). These limitations also bring the authorized
use of force within the category familiar in connection with enforcement of
conservation measures. 29

In the French version of the judgment, execution is translated as enforcement. The
court subsequently explained that "[b]oarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of
force for those purposes are all contained within the concept of enforcement of
conservation and management measures according to a 'natural and reasonable'
interpretation of this concept." 30 Thus, it seems that the French expression measures
coercitives is reserved for United Nations Charter Chapter VII-like measures.
To conclude this discussion on terminology, the English term enforcement is
clearly broader than the French term coercition. However, in the field of collective
security, the two terms are used as if they were synonymous. The problem of the term
coercition is that it does not cover all situations of enforcement in the field of
collective security. The problem with the term enforcement is that it covers too many
notions, incurring the risk of diluting its meaning.

Criminal Court, June 15- July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
NCONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
27. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (emphasis added).
28. Id. (French text).
29. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.) 1998 I.CJ. 432,466 (Dec. 4).
30. Id. at 433.
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It appears that the term execution could also be used in French in the field of
collective security, and that the use of the notion of coercition should be limited to
circumstances where the enforcement implies the use of coercive measures. Although
the term enforcement covers coercive measures, the latter expression should be used
only when one is clearly referring to measures that imply the use of force-not
necessarily armed force-with the purpose of modifying the behavior of its recipient.
Moreover, the term execution is full of nuances. Although often used as an equivalent
of mise en reuvre or application,3' the term can also mean the obtention par la
contrainte de/ 'accomp/issement d'une obligation, 32 that is, the accomplishment of an
obligation using coercion. For example, coercive measures that do not imply the use
of armed force will frequently be enforced in the sense that there will be simply an
application of these measures. At other times, these measures will be imposed. It is
important to distinguish between these two modalities of enforcement, because they
have different legal bases. Although an application is linked to the consent of the State
that enforces, the legality of an imposition will rely on another basis, such as Security
Council authorization.
This Article will now proceed to an analysis of the practice of the enforcement of
International Law by France and the United States in order to see if such linguistic
differences imply different perspectives on what constitutes enforcement within the
field of collective security. Both States have sought legal justification for enforcement
action, and both States mix a stricto sensu legal approach with the invocation of
important moral values.
Ill. THE

STRICTO SENSU LEGAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Both France and the United States have consistently professed the legality of their
enforcement actions in the field of collective security. There are several examples
illustrating this, and which assist in the identification of those arguments that have
concretely been invoked. To identify these arguments, the following most paradigmatic enforcement actions in recent practice are considered:
NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999
Intervention in Afghanistan in 2001
Intervention in Iraq in 2003
Intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003
Intervention in Haiti in 2004

From these examples, it appears that the arguments invoked are, classically, Security
Council authorization, self-defense, consent, and the legality of countermeasures.

31. "Application" is defined as: An operation, which gives effect to a rule of law or an administrative
or judicial decision, ofa fixed type or in the majority of specific situations. DICTIONNAIRE SALMON, supra
note 10, at 73. My translation of: "Operation consistant a donner effet a une regle de droit ou a une
decision administrative ou judiciaire, dans une espece determinee ou dans une generalite de cas
particuliers."
32. Id. at 478.

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 551 2006

552

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2

A. The Security Council as the Source of Legality
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter-the
first Article of Chapter VIIprovides that "[ t ]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain
or restore international peace and security. " 33 Articles 41 34 and 42 35 provide for a set
of measures known in French as mesures coercitives and in English as enforcement
measures. Where these Chapter VII conditions are met, enforcement actions will be
legal.
How have the United States and France been using these provisions of the United
Nations Charter in recent practice? The NATO intervention in Kosovo is the point of
departure in the search of legality in Security Council Resolutions, even though the
resolutions in question did not explicitly authorize the intervention. Indeed, in the
resolutions the Security Council adopted before the intervention, there was never an
explicit authorization of the use of armed force. As a result, the existence of implicit
authorization, or even of a tacit authorization, arose as notions.
Before the commencement of NA TO military operations, the Security Council
adopted three Resolutions, 36 none of which authorized the use of armed force. The
Security Council considered that the situation was a threat to international peace and
security3 7 and invoked Chapter VII, 38 but it only called on States "to make available
personnel to fulfill the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous
international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of
resolution 1160 ( 1998) are achieved. " 39 The Security Council then resolved, "should
the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160. ( 1998) not be
taken, [that it would] consider further action and additional measures to maintain or
restore peace and stability in the region.''40

33. U.N. Charter art. 39.
34. Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. Charter art. 41.
35. Article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures providedfor in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
36. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
37. S.C. Res. II 99, supra note 36.
38. S.C. Res. I 160, supra note 36.
39. S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 36, ,i 9.
40. Id. ,i 16 (emphasis added).
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During NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council did not adopt any
Resolution until after the conclusion of the Rambouillet agreement, 41 when it adopted
Resolution 1244 ( 1999), deciding that "a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall
be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles
and other required elements in annex 2.'"' 2 This annex was a statement by the
Chairman at the conclusion of a meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers and adopted on
May 6, 1999. One of the principles enunciated in the statement was the"[ d]eployrnent
in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted
by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common
objectives.'"' 3 Therefore, the Security Council authorized the establishment of an
"international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all
necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities.''44 Thus, in this case, there was neither
an implicit, nor a tacit authorization of military operations, chiefly aerial bombardment,
of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY). But the actions ofNATO States, seeking such a legal basis, demonstrated that such a foundation was a fundamental justification for their armed intervention.
The intervention in Iraq is another clear example of the desire to use Security
Council Resolutions to justify the legality of intervention. For example, in a letter
addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of
the United States to the United Nations explained why the Security Council
Resolutions provided a legal basis for armed intervention in Iraq:
These operations are necessary in view oflraq's continued material breaches of its
disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, including
resolution 1441 (2002). The operations are substantial and will secure compliance
with those obligations. In carrying out these operations, our forces will take all
reasonable precautions to avoid civilian casualties.

The actions being taken are authorized under existing Council resolutions,
including its resolutions 678 (] 990) and 687(]991). Resolution 687 ( 1991) imposed
a series of obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive disarmament
obligations, that were conditions of the ceasefire established under it. It has been
long recognized and understood that a material breach of these obligations removes
the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority to use force under resolution 678
(1990). 45

What is important here is not the reality of the legal basis but the necessity of finding
it, whatever it may have been. Moreover, the legal basis for the Iraq intervention was
transformed from one based on Resolution 687 into one based on the need to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security
Council, the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States
to the United Nations explained that:

41. U.N. Sec. Council, Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
Kosovo, Annex, S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999).
42. S.C. Res. 1244, ,i I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
43. Id. at Annex I (emphasis added).
44. Id. ,i 7.
45. Letter dated 21 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
President of the Security Council, fl 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351, (Mar. 21, 2003) (emphasis added).
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The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and Coalition partners continue to act together to ensure the complete
disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The States participating
in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law,
including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people oflraq. We
will act to ensure that Iraq's oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi
people. 46

In the case of Kosovo, the American and French positions were consistent, as they are
both member States ofNATO. With respect to Iraq, however, France did not support
the American position.
Yet, France decided to send troops to Afghanistan after the Security Council
recognized that the September 11 attacks allowed a response based on self-defense.
Although Security Council authorization was not necessary for action in Afghanistan
(if indeed this was a case of self-defense), it seems that Security Council recognition
of the legality of the action was important for France. As was stated in a letter:
On instructions from my Government, following the terrorist attacks perpetrated in
the United States of America on 11 September 2001, I have the honor to inform you
that, in accordance with the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense (Article 51 of the Charter), referred to in Security Council resolution
1368 (2001), and in response to the encouragement addressed to Member States by
the Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 1378 (2001), France has undertaken
action involving the participation of military air, land and naval forces.47

The legal basis of the intervention in Afghanistan transcends a Security Council
Resolution, which seems to be more like an endorsement. It rests ultimately on the
right of individual or collective self-defense, which is a fundamental exception to the
prohibition of the use of force.

B. Extension of the Self-Defense Exception
Self-defense is also invoked by France and the United States to justify the legality
of enforcement action. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the
United Nations, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, declared:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf
of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other
States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and
collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the
United States on 11 September 2001. 48

46. Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, ,rI, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003) (emphasis added).
4 7. Letter dated 23 November 200 I from the Permanent Representative ofFrance to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, ,r I, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1103 (Nov. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter U.N. Letter S/2001/1103].
48. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America
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Thus, not only the United States, but at least all the members of the Security Council
accepted the intervention in Afghanistan on the basis of self-defense, although the
September 11th attacks created a situation in which it was more than difficult to rely
on self-defense as an argument. The first problem was to determine against whom force
could be exercised in self-defense. Al-Qaida was and is not a State, and it was
impossible to use such an argument directly against a terrorist organization. Therefore,
due to the link between Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan, it
was considered that self-defense could be used to justify the use of force against the
latter. This argument can be rejected for purely formalistic reasons, or accepted if one
recognizes the de facto link between Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime. But this is not
the major criticism of the reliance of self-defense in the Afghanistan case. The most
serious problem is the non-observance of the notion of self-defense itself. Indeed, if
one examines this practice in light of United Nations Charter Article 51, it is clear that
the members of the Security Council have strayed from their responsibilities. Article
51 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 49

However, in Afghanistan, the Security Council never took such "measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security." Although there was dire need to maintain
and restore international peace and security in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, attacks, the Security Council never exercised its responsibility. In that sense, it
is arguable that other members of the Security Council, and notably France, were
accomplices to the United States in undermining the Security Council's powers and,
in reality, the whole system of collective security. By failing to respond proactively,
the Security Council ignored an important breach of international peace and security
and, in doing so, seemed to accept the breach itself.
C. State Consent

Another argument used to justify the legality of armed intervention has been the
consent of the State in which the intervention takes place. For example, in the Ivory
Coast, France contended that the Government and the rebels had asked France to
monitor the cease-fire that they had reached. The parties to the Linas-Marcoussis
agreement welcomed the cease-fire, which was "made possible and guaranteed by the
deployment of ECOW AS forces supported by French forces." 50

to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 11, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct.
7, 200 I) (emphasis added).
49. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
50. Letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex I (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement), 12, U.N. Doc.
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The Western European Union (WEU) clearly recognizes the legality of
interventions in States that have consented to an intervention. For example, with
respect to French interventions in several African States, the Rapporteur of the Defence
Committee declared that "[b ]eyond the evacuation of French citizens protected by the
French consulate and other Foreign citizens, and the protecting of French property,
these interventions are generally made with the objective of reestablishing order,
suppressing rebellion and crushing insurrections at an early stage. "51 The
organization then concluded that, as long as these interventions were based on prior
defense agreements, United Nations authorization would be unnecessary. 52
It appears, therefore, that both the United States and France have a utilitarian
appreciation of the United Nations Security Council, as enforcement actions are often
justified on behalf of a Security Council authorization. However, legal arguments do
not stand alone; they frequently underlie a moral conception of what the international
order should be, thereby indicating that the relationship between law and morals
remains undefined.
IV. LEGITIMATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
WHERE AND WHEN LAW MEETS MORALITY
Other arguments, which go further than legality stricto sensu, have been invoked
to justify enforcement actions. Indeed, States sometimes invoke moral values, often in
addition to the legal arguments examined earlier in this Article. A real tension appears
then between enforcement actions and certain moral values. It is often very superficially said that the United States has a moral approach to international relations and
that the arguments Americans invoke are far from being merely legal. But this is not
only an American characteristic. Ifwe examine recent enforcement actions led by the
United States and/or France, we see that they have both argued moral considerations
in order to legitimize actions, which were often clearly illegal.

A. Tension Between Legality and Legitimacy
Very often, legality and legitimacy justifications for enforcement actions are
mixed. For example, during the 1993 crisis in Haiti, the Security Council determined
that the situation there threatened international peace and security. 53 Afterwards, the
Council of the European Communities specified which facts had created such a threat:
"[t]he Community and its Member States, meeting within the framework of political
cooperation, have repeatedly expressed their concern about the persistent absence of

S/2003/99 (Jan. 27, 2003).
51. Western European Union Assembly, Defence Committee, La contribution de /'UEO au
renforcement de la paix en Afrique centrale, § 124, at 23, WEU Doc. 1566 (May 13, 1997) (prepared by
M. Masseret, Rapporteur, Rec. 612) (emphasis added) [hereinafter WEU Committee Report]. My
translation of: "Outre !'evacuation des ressortissants fran\:ais et d'autres citoyens etrangers et la protection
de biens fran\:ais, ces interventions avaient generalement pour objectif de retablir l'ordre, d'etouffer les
rebellions ou d'ecraser les mutineries a un stade peu avance.").
52. Id.
53. S.C. Res. 841, ,i 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993)(detennining''that, in these unique and
exceptional circumstances, the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and security in
the region").
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democracy and the rule of law in Haiti and the need for effective action to end this
situation. " 54
Thus, from the European perspective, it was the absence of democracy and the rule
of law that had justified an enforcement action against Haiti. At the time, however, it
was not clear whether or not there had been a violation of international law. Instead,
European values and the European conception of what the international order should
be served as acceptable reasons for the Security Council's adoption of a Resolution to
intervene in Haiti.
More recently, during the 2004 crisis in Haiti, the French Foreign Affairs Minister,
Dominique de Villepin, made the following declaration:
The situation in Haiti is continuing to deteriorate.
A race in [sic] under way between those who support violence and those who are still
hoping for a peaceful solution. Haiti is now threatened with chaos. It is the duty of
the international community to assume its responsibility to preserve the country from
disorder and violence

All of the above must be legitimized and implemented by the international
community.
- Our proposals could be submitted to the OAS and CARICOM and the plan,
thus strengthened, could be conveyed to the United Nations for adoption by the
Security Council. 55

Foreign Minister Villepin's declaration invokes other ill-defined notions to justify
international intervention: disorder, violence and chaos.
The NATO intervention in Kosovo was probably the clearest example of the
tension between law and morality. We have already examined the different legal
arguments advanced to justify this intervention. In addition, however, non-legal
arguments were put forth to justify the NATO intervention. NATO declared during
its Washington Summit on Kosovo:
NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) supports
the political aims of the international community, which were reaffirmed in recent
statements by the UN Secretary-General and the European Union: a peacefa/, multiethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy
universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis. 56

54. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1608/93 of 24 June 1993, preamble, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 2, 2
(introducing an embargo concerning certain trade between the European Economic Community and Haiti)
(emphasis added).
55. Letter dated 25 February2004 from the Permanent Representatives ofFrance to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex (Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of France, Dominique de Villepin, on the situation in Haiti), ff 1-2, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2004/145 (Feb. 25,
2004) (emphasis added).
56. Press Release, NATO, Statement on Kosovo ,i 2, NATO Doc. S-1(99)62 (Apr. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter Statement on Kosovo) (emphasis added).
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In this regard, General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
justified the aerial intervention in the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia by describing the
scene in moral terms:
Allied military forces were confronted daily with the horrific consequences of "ethnic
cleansing"-the deliberate violent expulsion of an entire people from their native
land. Even from 15,000 feet above Kosovo, the evidence was all too clear: empty,
destroyed villages; hundreds of thousands of people on the move; the smoke of
thousands of burning homes. On the ground, the stories of cruelty and abusesummary executions, organised rape and beatings perpetrated on young and old
alike-bore even closer witness to the campaign of terror waged by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia against its Albanian minority.57

The attacks by the Allied Force were therefore justified on behalf of "the values for
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of
law." 58 Actions undertaken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were considered to
be ''the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence
pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic." 59 Thus,
atrocities against the people ofKosovo by Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary
forces "represent a flagrant violation of international law." 60
Earlier, the European Union had adopted a declaration on the NATO intervention,
considering whether the intervention was justified by humanitarian reasons. The
European Council pointed out that the objective ofNATO actions was ''to put an end
to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo." 61
The argument of countermeasures has also been used to justify enforcement
actions in the field of collective security. These countermeasures-mainly economic
sanctions-are a means to enforce international law. How do the United States and the
European Union justify the adoption of economic sanctions? They usually invoke a
previous violation of existing international obligations by the sanctioned country. But
such a violation usually accompanies the existence of a threat to international peace
and security and underlies the violation of a plethora of ill-defined moral values.
For example, although the United States argues that the adoption of sanctions
results from a country's breach of democratic principles, the European Union will
build democratic principles into treaties with third States and, when these principles
have been violated, will terminate the treaty as a countermeasure.
Therefore, the international regime for economic sanctions adopted against third
States has to follow the countermeasures regime. Accordingly, countermeasures are
taken by a State that has been injured by the violation of an obligation. However, the
International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility has
created major controversies over whether or not States other than the injured State
have the right to adopt countermeasures. In its commentary, the ILC explains that:

57. Wesley K. Clark, When Force is Necessary: NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis,
NATO REVIEW, Summer 1999, at 14.
58. Statement on Kosovo, supra note 56, ,r1.
59. Id.
60. Id. ,r11.
61. Presidency Conclusions, European Council on Kosovo (Mar. 25, 1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9903/i 1041.htm.
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One issue is whether countermeasures may be taken by third States which are not
themselves individually injured by the internationally wrongful act in question,
although they are owed the obligation which has been breached. For example, in the
case of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole the
International Court has affirmed that all States have a legal interest in compliance.
Article 54 leaves open the question whether any State may take measures to ensure
compliance with certain international obligations in the general interest as distinct
from its own individual interest as an injured State. While article 22 does not cover
measures taken in such a case to the extent that these do not qualify as countermeasures, neither does it exclude that possibility.62
This statement shows the lack of agreement in the ILC on this question and the subsequent choice to let the question remain open instead of clearly establishing whether or
not third States can adopt countermeasures.
In some cases, the threat to international peace and security has been considered
a violation of a collective interest When Iraq occupied Kuwait, and also during the
NATO intervention in Kosovo, the European Community adopted several enforcement
measures like embargos, legislation permitting assets to be frozen, and bans on
flights. 63 For some of its Member States, 64 such a prohibition made it impossible to
enforce several bilateral aerial agreements:
Because of doubts about the legitimacyof the action, the British government initially
was prepared to follow the one-year denunciation procedure provided for in article
17 of its agreement with Yugoslavia. However, it later changed its position and
denounced flights with immediate effect. Justifying the measure, it stated that
"President Milosevic's ... worsening record on human rights, means that, on moral
and political grounds, he has forfeited the right ofhis Government to insist on the 12
months notice which would normally apply.''65
These measures serve as an intervention responding to a threat to international peace
and security. States have therefore claimed that they were adopted for the protection
of a collective interest. The ILC Draft provides that any State other than an injured
State is entitled to act in response if"[t]he obligation breached is owed to a group of
States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest

62. U.N. Int'! Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-third session (23
April-I June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 182-83, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://untreaty
.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm [hereinafter Report of the International Law Commission].
63. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 84 AM.J. INT'LL. 885,903 (1990) (referring to President Bush's August 2, 1990 Executive Orders).
See also Council Common Position (EC) No. 326/1998 of7 May 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 143) I (defined by
the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union concerning the freezing of funds
held abroad by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian Governments); Council Common Position
(EC) No. 426/1998 of29 June 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 190) 3 (defined by the Council on the basis of Article
J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union concerning a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community).
64. More specifically, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
65. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 62, at 353. Afterwards "[t]he Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia protested these measures as 'unlawful, unilateral and an example of the policy of
discrimination."' Id.
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of the group. " 66 The validity of this provision is more than uncertain. In this sense,
even the ILC noted that:
(T]he current state of international law on countermeasurestaken in the general or
collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number
of States. At present there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States
referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest.
Consequently it is not appropriate to include in the present Articles a provision
concerning the question whether other States, identified in article 48, are permitted
to take countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its
obligations. Instead chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position
and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of international
law.67
Therefore, Article 54, as it has been presented by Rapporteur J. Crawford remains
unsupported by contemporary practice. Article 54 does not codify international law but
contains instead a saving clause which leaves open a question to be decided at a later
date. 68 The ILC commentary thus implies that, for States other than the injured State,
international practice only recognizes the possibility to react with legal measures but
not with unlawful measures no matter how legitimate they may seem. Thus, this Article
is very limited, as it only reaffirms the legality of retaliatory measures.
Treaty practice also demonstrates the importance of certain values and how a
treaty violation could form the basis for enforcement action. In Europe, the inclusion
of conditionality provisions in treaties between an organization and a third State has
been conceived as a tool to further respect for human rights, democratic principles, the
rule of Jaw, and good governance in public affairs (bonne gestion des affaires
publiques). 69 The partnership agreement between the members of the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its member
States provides: "Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule oflaw,
which underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international
policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement." 70 In
the next paragraph, it adds that: "Good governance, which underpins the ACP-EU

66. Id.at 318.
67. Id. at 355.
68. For a discussion of ambiguities relating to the adoption of collective countermeasures, see LinosAlexandros Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations
of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1127, 1141-44 (2002).
69. See, e.g.. Peter Ballantyne, La conditionna/ite sur la sellette, LoME 2000, May 1997, at 3; Peter
Ballantyne, Les accords de /'UE avec /es pays tiers: des ler;onspour /'apres-Lome?, LoME 2000, Oct.
1997, at 2; Isabelle Biagiotti & Peter Uvin, Nouvelles conditions de I 'aide-Au service de la democratie?,
LECOURRIERDELAPLANETE,Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 19-21; Yannick Jadot, Vers un nouveau partenariat UEACP? De la conditionna/ite au contrat, SOLAGRAL,Jan. 1999; Andre Monkam, Les dimensions po/itiques
du futur partenariat: comment promouvoir droits de/ 'homme, democratie et gouvernance, Document de
travail, ECDPM, Sept. 1997.
70. Partnership Agreement (EC) No. 483/2000 of 23 June 2000, art. 9, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3, 9
(Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the
one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou).
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Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and
constitute a fundamental element of this Agreement." 71
Article 96 of the same agreement provides that there will be consultations in the
event that these principles are violated. Furthermore, it provides that: "If the
consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation is
refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These
measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have disappeared. " 72
Similarly, the Common Position of June 2, 1997 of the European Union Council
concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa provides that in order "to
contribute better to the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa," the European
Union shall notably seek "to use the various instruments available coherently to
promote effective conflict prevention and resolution. " 73 For that purpose, the Council
notes that:
[I]n accordance with the relevant procedures, steps will be taken to ensure
coordination of the efforts of the European Community and those of the Member
States in this field, including with regard to development cooperation and the support
for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. 74

Thus, the European Union Council considers that conditionality provisions in treaties
with African states are a conflict prevention and resolution measure. For example, the
expulsion of the Head of the European Union Electoral Mission from Zimbabwe on
February 16, 2002, led to the European Union's adoption of a common position which
expressed serious concern about the situation in Zimbabwe and notably about "recent
legislation in Zimbabwe which, if enforced, would seriously infringe on the right to
freedom of speech, assembly and association, mainly the Public Order and Security
Act and the General Laws Amendment Act." 75 The EU Council then decided that it
would close "the consultations conducted under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement and implement targeted sanctions." 76

B. Confusion Between Legitimacy and National Interests
In a declaration, the WEU Rapporteur considered that Europe should take the
place of the United States, as it had abandoned any global responsibility, as long as its

71. Id.
72. Id. art. 9 at 40. This article specifies what "appropriate measures" are:
The "appropriate measures" referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with
international Jaw, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures,
priority must be given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement. It is
understood that suspension would be a measure oflast resort.

Id.
73. Council Common Position (EC) No. 356/1997 of2 June 1997, art. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 153) 1, I
(defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, concerning conflict
prevention and resolution in Africa).
74. Id.
75. Council Common Position (EC) No. 145/2002 of 18 February 2002, preamble, 2002 O.J. (L 50)
1, 1.

16. Id.
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security or its national interests were not affected. 77 He affirmed in this regard that "if
Europe wishes to play or is forced to play a more important role in certain regions of
the world where its security and vital interests are at stake, it should be prepared to take
measures that could end in deployment of force and military intervention "78
However, if French interventions are closely examined, it is hard to see how
France is assuming global responsibility in the field ofinternational peace and security.
France will only intervene when it has an interest in such an intervention. Unilateral
peacekeeping operations demonstrate this phenomenon very well. These operations
have not been initiated by the United Nations, the Security Council, or by any
subsidiary body. The operations have been undertaken outside the United Nations
System, except for United Nations authorization. For example, the French Operation
Licorne in the Ivory Coast was authorized by Resolution 1464 (2003) 79 and the
Multinational Interim Force in Haiti by Resolution 1529 (2004). 80 Thus, the United
Nations only authorized these operations and the possible use of force should it
become necessary to defend their missions.
Therefore, sixty years after the creation of the United Nations and a major effort
to have global operations led by the United Nations, the prevalence of operations led
by an individual country is a huge step back. Instead of trying to find new ways to
reinforce the United Nations system, States like the United States or France have
preferred to go back to the solution of individual actions. Although they are probably
more efficient in the short-term, in the long-run, it is difficult to say that they will
create acceptable solutions for the States where they intervene. In any case, though, it
is a clear breach of the United Nations collective security system. Moreover, the
examples of the FIAS in Afghanistan, the Multinational Interim Force in Haiti, the
Operation Licorne in the Ivory Coast, or ECOFORCE and ECOMIL in Western Africa
indicate that States only deploy troops when they have an interest to defend.
V. CONCLUSION: DETERIORATION OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM BY
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

In a 2001 Resolution, the Security Council declared that it was ready ''to take all
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat
all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations." 81 At the end of the day, however, the Security Council, although it
had been taking some controversial measures to combat terrorism, never responded to
the September 11th attacks, failing to assume its responsibilities under the United
Nations Charter. As Alain Pellet noted, regarding the failure of the Security Council

77. WEU Committee Report, supra note 53, ,r135, at 24. In French, M. Masseret's original statement
declared that the United States "se sont decharges de toute responsabilite al'echelle mondiale, des lors que
leur securite et leurs interets nationaux ne sont pas directement touches."
78. Id. My translation of: "Si l'Europe souhaite ou n'a pas d'autre choix que de jouer un role plus
important dans certaines regions du monde ou sa propre securite et ses interets vitaux sont en jeu, elle devra
se preparer a prendre des initiatives qui pourront aboutir au deploiement d'une force d'intervention
militaire."
79. S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003).
80. S.C. Res. 1529, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
81. S.C. Res. 1368, ,r5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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to adopt retaliatory measures in response to the September 11th attacks: "Even though
peace and global international security are threatened, The United Nations leaves the
playing field wide open to the United States. This conforms neither to the spirit of the
[United Nations] Charter, the Declaration of Intention of September 12th, nor to the
concept of collective security." 82 No proper vehicle has been found, therefore, for the
Security Council to exercise its powers, despite the euphoria resulting from the end of
the Cold War and the subsequent revitalization of Chapter VII of the Charter.
Jurgen Habermas wrote an interesting essay after the 2003 Iraq intervention in
which he tried to clarify the differences between "the continental European and the
Anglo-American powers" over strategies for justifying military actions:
The Europeans had drawn the lesson from the disaster at Srebrenica: they understood
armed intervention as a way of closing the gap between efficiency and legitimacy that
had been opened by earlier peacekeeping operations, and thus saw it as a means for
making progress toward fully institutionalized civil rights. England and America,
conversely, satisfied themselves with the normative goal of promulgating their own
liberal order internationally, through violence if necessary. At the time of the
intervention in Kosovo, I had attributed this difference to contrasting traditions of
legal thought-Kant's cosmopolitanism on the one side, John Stuart Mill's liberal
nationalism on the other. But in light of the hegemonic unilateralism that the leading
thinkers of the Bush Doctrine have pursued since 1991 (see the documentation by
Stefan Frolich in the FAZ from April 10th, 2003 ), one suspects in hindsight that the
American delegation had already led the negotiations at Rambouillet from just this
peculiar viewpoint. 83

We think that, indeed, the differences between the Anglo-American conception
regarding international law and the Continental-European conception cannot be found
in a legalistic approach. We cannot clearly state, however, that while ContinentalEurope wants to progress toward fully institutionalized civil rights, America wants only
to impose a liberal order. French practice demonstrates that France acts not only when
necessary to protect civil rights, but also when necessary to protect national interests.
Similarly, the United States acts to impose a liberal order, but actually appears more
driven to engage in enforcement actions when necessary to defend national interests.
In the same article, Habermas asserts that the American decision to consult the
Security Council "certainly didn't arise from any wish for legitimation through
international law, which had long since been regarded, at least internally, as
superfluous. Rather, this rear-guard action was desired only insofar as it broadened the
basisfor a 'coalition of the willing, 'and soothed a worried population." 84 Similarly,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1464 after France initiated Operation Licome

82. Alain Pellet, Malaise dans la guelle: a quoi sert l'ONU?, LE MONDE, Nov. 15, 2001 (emphasis
added). My translation of: "[B]ien meme, c'est la paix et la securite intemationales globales qui sont
menacees, les Nations unies laissent le champ libre aux Etats-Unis. Ce n'est conforme ni a !'esprit de la
Charte ni a la declaration d'intention du 12 septembre, ni a l'idee meme de securite collective."
83. Jiirgen Habermas, Interpreting the Fall of a Monument, 4 GERMAN L. J. 701, 703-04 (2003)
(emphasis added).
84. Id at 704 (emphasis added).
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in the Ivory Coast. 85 In addition, France only consulted the Security Council for an
"endorsement" rather than for authorization. 86
In conclusion, an examination of recent practice shows that individual States-not
only the United States but other States including France-have contributed to the
fragility of the collective security system designed by the United Nations Charter. The
Security Council and its member States, however, have also significantly contributed
to the disintegration of the collective security system. On the one hand, the Security
Council is expanding its powers beyond what is envisioned in the United Nations
Charter, as exemplified by its actions in defining terrorism. On the other hand,
however, the Security Council has not been assuming full responsibility when there is
a threat to or breach of international peace and security. Thus, for other States to point
to the United States as the main culprit in the decline of the United Nations is a failure
of those States to assume responsibility for their own complicity in this failure.
Although France is often considered an ardent defender of the useful "machin," as
General de Gaulle referred to the United Nations, its actions are paradigmatic of the
bad faith of other States, and mainly of the members of the Security Council who still
benefit from the veto power.

85. S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003).
86. In the Conclusions of the Conference of Heads of State on Cote d'Ivoire, it was stated that the
Linas-Marcoussis agreement: "affirms the importance of support from the States members of ECO WAS
and the United Nations in restoring peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire ... and welcomes the adoption of
the statement issued by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2002, which
endorsed that deployment." Letter dated 27, January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex II (Conclusions of the
Conference of Heads of State on Cote d'Ivoire), ,i 13, U.N. Doc. S/2003/99 (Jan. 27, 2003) (emphasis
added).

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 564 2006

CONTRASTINGPERSPECTIVESON PREEMPTIVE
STRIKE:THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND THE
WAR ON TERROR
Sophie Clavier
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION
THE USE OF FORCE: FROM CONGRUENCE TO DIVERGENCE
Is IRAQ A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT?
THE GREATER CONTEXT OF THE FRANCO-AMERICAN QUARREL

V.

CONCLUSION

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 565 2006

